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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: THE GROWTH AND EVOLUTION
OF RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES
THOMAS

F.

HARRISON*

Although few in number, the 1978-79 term decisions by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in the area of environmental law dealt with a broad range of environmental issues. These
issues include strict liability for discharges of oil into navigable waters,'
restoration of shoreline damage, 2 new source performance standards
under the Clean Air Act 3 and public participation in the enforcement
of water pollution laws. 4 The Seventh Circuit also reviewed adjudicatory hearings under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 5 permit7 program 6 and common law nuisance under the Clean

Water Act.

STRICT LIABILITY FOR THE DISCHARGE OF OIL

The strict liability provisions of section 311 (b)(6) of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act, 8 now the Clean Water Act, 9 were upheld
* Regional Counsel, United States Environmental Protection Agency, Region V, Chicago,
Ill.; B.A., Holy Cross College; J.D., Fordham Law School; admitted to practice in Illinois and
New York. The views expressed in this article are strictly those of the author and do not in any
way represent the opinion or policy of the United States Environmental Protection Agency.
1. United States v. Tex-Tow, Inc., 589 F.2d 1310 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co., 589 F.2d 1305 (7th Cir. 1978).
2. Save the Dunes Council v. Alexander, 584 F.2d 158 (7th Cir. 1978).
3. Central Illinois Pub. Serv. Co. v. EPA, 594 F.2d 636 (7th Cir. 1979).
4. Citizens for a Better Environment v. EPA, 596 F.2d 720, reh. denied, 596 F.2d 725 (7th
Cir. 1979).
5. Hereinafter referred to as NPDES.
6. Alton Box Bd. Co. v. EPA, 592 F.2d 395 (7th Cir. 1979).
7. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1979), petition for cert. filed, 48
U.S.L.W. 3259 (U.S. Sept. 11, 1979) (No. 79-571).
8. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6) (1976). This section was amended by the Clean Water Act of
1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1593-96 (1977), but the cases arose and were decided under the
pre-amendment language. The current version of section 311 maybe found at 33 U.S.C.A. § 1321
(1978).
9. Section 2 of the 1977 amendments noted that although the act may be cited as the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, the full regulatory scheme would henceforth be "commonly
referred to as the Clean Water Act." Although the Seventh Circuit used both designations in the
five Clean Water Act cases decided in its 1978-79 term, the current nomenclature will be used in
this article. See 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251-1376 (1978).
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by the Seventh Circuit during the 1978-79 term.10 Section 311(b)(6)
establishes a basic "no discharge" policy for oil and hazardous substances and prohibits discharges of these materials in harmful quantities." When a discharge does occur, three distinct liabilities are
provided for under the section: liability for the actual cost of removal
of the substance;' 2 liability for a variable civil penalty if the substance
is not removable; 13 and liability for a civil penalty of not more than
$5,000 for each offense. 14 Section 31 (k) of the Clean Water Act' 5 provides that this last civil penalty not to exceed $5,000 for each offense is
to be used as a means of funding the enforcement and administration
of section 311. In addition, acts of God, acts of war, negligence of the
United States and acts or omissions of a third party are available as
defenses to liability under this section' 6 except that the civil penalty is
not to exceed $5,000 where there is strict liability. It was this strict
liability provision which was addressed by the Seventh Circuit in two
related cases of first impression during 1978.
Fault was not an issue in either United States v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co. '7 or United States v. Tex-Tow, Inc. 18 Marathon is the owner
of an underground pipeline located in southern Illinois. The easement
for the line had been duly recorded with the local recorder's office and
the line itself was marked in full compliance with applicable regulations. The owner of the land was having an irrigation ditch constructed
when a bulldozer struck the pipe during the summer of 1975. The bulldozer damage ultimately caused the pipe to split and in November
1975 the company was informed that oil was being discharged from the
pipe into the Kaskaskia River. Marathon took immediate steps to contain the spill and promptly reported the incident to the EPA. About
20,000 gallons of crude oil were discharged and a little more than half
of this was either recovered or burned. The record established that
Marathon was not at fault with regard to the digging or the damage
prior to the spill.' 9 Nevertheless, in an action brought by the United

10. United States v. Tex-Tow, Inc., 589 F.2d 1310 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co., 589 F.2d 1305 (7th Cir. 1978).
11. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1321(b)(1), 1321(b)(3) (1976).
12. ld § 1321(f).
13. ld § 1321(b)(2)(B)(iii).
14. Id § 1321(b)(6).
15. ld § 1321(k).
16. Id §§ 1321(0, 1321(b)(2)(B)(ii).
17. 589 F.2d 1305 (7th Cir. 1978).
18. 589 F.2d 1310 (7th Cir. 1978).
19. 589 F.2d at 1307.
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States Coast Guard under section 31 l(b)(6), 20 the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Illinois entered a judgment enforcing a
2
civil penalty of $2,000 against Marathon. '
In UnitedStates v. Tex-Tow, Inc.,22 Tex-Tow was the operator of a
tank barge which was being loaded with gasoline at a dock owned and
operated by Mobil Oil Company. As the barge was being filled, it sank
into the water and ultimately struck a submerged steel piling that punctured its hull and caused some 1600 gallons of gasoline to be discharged into the river. The record established that there was no
23
reasonable way the company could have known about the piling.
The same district court again entered judgment in favor of the Coast
Guard assessing a $350 civil penalty against Tex-Tow 24 under section
311 (b)(6).
Both Marathon and Tex-Tow appealed to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Marathon argued that, in the absence of fault, no more than a nominal civil penalty could be imposed
under section 31 l(b)(6). 25 Tex-Tow, on the other hand, argued that no
penalty at all could be imposed on a party that did not "cause" the
discharge. 26 Both companies contended that the purpose of the civil
penalty is to serve as a deterrent to spills and that assessment of a penalty in the absence of fault would not fill that deterrent role, thereby
invalidating section 31 l(b)(6) as not bearing a reasonable relationship
to a proper legislative purpose. In addition, Tex-Tow argued that the
third party causation defense available under section 311 (f) should be
27
read into the civil penalty provision.
The Seventh Circuit rejected these arguments, although not without some reservations, as evidenced by the concurring opinions of
Judges Bauer and Wood. 28 Judge Castle, writing for the majority, reviewed section 311 in its entirety and found it to be a clear and unambiguous manifestation of the intent of Congress "to impose a
substantial civil penalty on owners or operators even in the absence of
fault and that such an intent is well within the constitutional powers of
20. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6) (1976).
21. See 589 F.2d at 1307.
22. 589 F.2d 1310 (7th Cir. 1978).

23. Id.at 1312.
24. Id.at 1317.
25. 589 F.2d at 1307-08.

26. 589 F.2d at 1312.
27.
28.

Id at 1313.
United States v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 589 F.2d 1305, 1310 (7th Cir. 1978) (Bauer, J.

and Wood, J.,concurring).
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Congress. ' 29 The Seventh Circuit therefore rejected the companies' attempts to read into section 31 l(b)(6) anything other than what Congress had intended to include in the section. As a matter of statutory
30
construction, the Seventh Circuit had no other choice.
In essence, the court in Marathon and Tex-Tow found that the
strict liability provision was enacted for the purpose of economic regulation rather than as a means of deterrence. The Seventh Circuit stated
that strict liability "though performing a residual deterrent function is
based on the economic premise that certain enterprises ought to bear
the social costs of their activities." 3' The court concluded that by enacting the Clean Water Act, Congress "made a legislative determination that polluters rather than the public should bear the costs of water
pollution." 32 The court declined to question the wisdom of this congressional determination, merely noting that "the Supreme Court has
not invalidated an economic regulation on substantive due process
grounds since 1937. .. .
Tex-Tow's argument that there must be some causal relationship
between the pollution and the obligation of a particular party to bear
clean-up costs was answered by the Seventh Circuit in one word: foreseeability. The Seventh Circuit stated:
Tex-Tow was engaged in the type of enterprise which will inevitably
cause pollution and on which Congress has determined to shift the
cost of pollution when the additional element of an actual discharge
is present. These two elements, actual pollution plus statistically
foreseeable pollution attributable to a statutorily defined type of enterprise, together satisfy the requirement of cause in fact and legal
cause. Foreseeability both creates legal responsibility and limits it.
An enterprise such as Tex-Tow engaged in the transport of oil can
foresee that spills will result despite all precautions and that some of
these will result from the acts or omissions of third parties. Although
a third party may be responsible for the immediate act or omission
which "caused" the spill, Tex-Tow was engaged in the activity or
enterprise which "caused" the spill. Congress had the power to make
the "cause" of the spill
certain oil-related activities or enterprises
34
rather than the conduct of a third party.
Since Marathon and Tex-Tow were engaged in a type of business enterprise in which pollution is "statistically foreseeable," the Seventh
29.
30.
Corp. v.
31.
32.
33.
34.

id at 1308.
See, e.g., Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917); International Tel. & Tel.
General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 518 F.2d 913, 917-18 (9th Cir. 1975).
589 F.2d at 1309 (citations omitted).
Id (citations omitted).
Id at 1308 (citations omitted).
589 F.2d at 1313-14 (citations omitted).
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Circuit concluded that this fact, combined with the actual spill, was
sufficient to sustain the imposition of the civil penalty based on strict
liability. 35 Thus, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the two district court
judgments.
Judges Wood and Bauer concurred with Judge Castle's analysis of
the law but expressed some reservations about the practical results
flowing from it. According to Judge Wood, it is basically unfair to penalize a business whose only "fault" was that it was in business:
"[1]ittle good can be accomplished in these particular circumstances by
this unusual process which is generally considered to be contrary to the
accepted principles of law and equity."' 36 Judge Bauer contended that
to "punish a business engaged in enterprises essential to our national
well-being for an unfortunate accident when the business is faultless,
'37
seems to be a self-defeating exercise of power.
While the Seventh Circuit reached the correct conclusion in Marathon and Tex-Tow as a matter of statutory construction, there is also
little doubt that the result is, indeed, troublesome. Clearly, Congress
has the power to deal with the question of oil spills in the manner provided in section 311 of the Clean Water Act.38 But just as the concept
of "guilt by association" is inimical to our jurisprudential system, so
too is a regulatory scheme premised upon a concept of "guilt by engaging in a business enterprise." Congress did not address this particular
issue during its deliberations on the 1977 amendments. Resolution of
this issue, then, perhaps along the line of a greater relationship between
more proximate cause and the civil penalty, awaits another day.
PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE RIVERS
AND HARBORS ACT OF

1968

Council v. Alexander,3 9

In Save The Dunes
the Seventh Circuit upheld certain actions by the Army Corps of Engineers 40 under section
Ill of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1968. 4 1 Section 111 authorizes
the Secretary of the Army, acting through the Chief of the Corps of
Engineers, to investigate, study and construct projects to prevent or
42
mitigate shore damage attributable to federal navigation works.
35.

Id.at 1314.

36. 589 F.2d at 1310 (Wood, J., concurring).
37. Id (Bauer, J., concurring).
38. See text accompanying notes 8-15 supra.
39. 584 F.2d 158 (7th Cir. 1978).

40. Hereinafter referred to as the Corps.
41.
42.

33 U.S.C. § 426i (1976).
Id
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Save the Dunes involved erosion to the Lake Michigan shoreline of
the Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore4 3 caused by certain federallydeveloped harbor structures in Michigan City Harbor, Indiana. In
1970, the town of Beverly Shores, located within the Dunes, asked the
Corps to study the erosion and to take remedial action under section
111.44 The Corps undertook a preliminary study and in 1971 reported
that the harbor structures had caused about sixty percent of the erosion
of the Dunes.4 5 Based on these preliminary findings, the Corps arranged for the preparation of a more detailed report. This involved
consideration of various proposals and alternatives. A "final feasibility
report" was issued recommending the authorization of a shoreline protection project to rebuild the beach west of the harbor structures. A
draft environmental impact statement for the project was filed with the
46
Council on Environmental Quality.
In 1973, while the final report was still in preparation, the Save the
Dunes Council brought suit to compel the Corps to take remedial action on the shoreline damage caused by the harbor structures. Count I
of the complaint alleged that the Secretary of the Army was required to
mitigate the erosion damage and that the council was entitled to a writ
of mandamus to compel the Secretary to act. 4 7 Count II alleged that
the harbor structures constituted a public nuisance and that the Secretary had abused his discretion in failing to stop or alleviate the erosion
caused by the structures. The council sought mandatory injunctive relief under the Administrative Procedure Act. 4 8 The Corps moved to
dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. After a lengthy
delay,49 the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
Corps.50
The Seventh Circuit unanimously affirmed the lower court decision on procedural grounds. The court in Save the Dunes held that
mandamus jurisdiction 5' is present "only when a clear, plainly defined,
43. Hereinafter referred to as the Dunes.
44. 33 U.S.C. § 426i (1976).
45. The harbor structures interfere with the natural westward littoral movement of sand and
other beach building materials to the shoreline. The remainder of the erosion is attributable to
high lake levels and steep waves. See 584 F.2d at 161.
46. Actual construction, however, is contingent upon congressional authorization and funding, and the Seventh Circuit noted that the Corps' report is expected to be submitted during the
1979-80 sessions of Congress. See id at 161.
47. Id. at 158.
48. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1976).
49. The delay was occasioned by the retirement of one district court judge and the reassignment of the case to another judge.
50. See 584 F.2d at 158.
51. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1361 (1978).
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and peremptory duty on the federal defendant is shown and there is a
lack of an adequate remedy other than mandamus."5 2 The Seventh
Circuit noted that the language of section 11113 is discretionary rather
than mandatory, concluding that no peremptory duty existed upon
54
which a writ of mandamus could be predicated.
Having determined that the Secretary's duty under section 11 1 is
discretionary in nature, the Seventh Circuit next considered whether
there had been any abuse of that discretion in the form of inaction by
the Secretary. The court noted that the National Environmental Policy
Act of 196955 requires the Secretary to "utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach . . . in planning and in decisionmaking .. . 56
NEPA further requires the preparation of an environmental impact
statement that, inter alia, discusses alternatives to the proposed action.
The court in Save the Dunes held that the Secretary had no choice but
to comply with these provisions and that in so doing he was not causing
any unreasonable delay.5 7 Specifically, the court found that the Secretary was exercising his discretion, without delay or abuse, and was acting in a reasonable and responsible manner to develop a feasible plan
for the prevention of the extreme Lake Michigan water erosion threat
58
to the Dunes.
The court disposed of the claim for relief under the Administrative
Procedure Act in summary fashion. The Corps' actions were found not
59
to be subject to review since they were not yetfinal agency actions.
Thus, the Seventh Circuit concluded that there was no final agency ac60
tion upon which judicial relief could be based.
Save the Dunes appears to be the first court of appeals case construing section 111. The decision, however, does not create any procedural or environmental precedent. Rather, the Secretary of the Army
52. 584 F.2d at 162.
53. Section I I I provides, in pertinent part:
The Secretary . . is authorized to investigate, study and construct projects for the prevention or mitigation of shore damages attributable to federal navigation works.
33 U.S.C. § 426i (1976) (emphasis added).
54. 584 F.2d at 164.
55. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as NEPAl.
56. 584 F.2d at 164, quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(A) (1976).
57. 584 F.2d at 164. In so holding, the Seventh Circuit added that "the Secretary, acting
through the Corps, rather than taking ill-advised precipitous affirmative action in tearing out the
harbor structures, has complied with statutory and administrative requirements for well-advised
decision-making." Id
58. Id.
59. The agency's actions were not final since the Corps' decision-making and planning
processes were still ongoing. See id
60. Id.
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acted under section 11 1 and the Seventh Circuit in Save the Dunes
merely affirmed the correctness of the Secretary's actions.
NEW SOURCE PERFORMANCE STANDARDS
UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT

Unlike the Secretary of the Army, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency was far less successful in CentralIllinois
Public Service Co. v. EPA. 6' CentralIllinois Public Service involved an
interpretation of the "innovative technology" waiver provisions added
62
to section 111 of the Clean Air Act by the 1977 amendments.
Section 111 requires the EPA administrator to publish a list of categories of stationary sources of air pollution 63 and then to promulgate
federal standards of performance for new sources within each category. 64 The standard of performance must reflect the degree of emission limitation and the percentage reduction that is achievable through
the application of "the best technological system of continuous emission reduction which . . . has been adequately demonstrated." 65 A
"new" source is one the construction or modification of which commences after the publication or proposal of a standard of performance. 66 Once a standard has been promulgated, no new source may be
operated in violation of its requirements. 67 However, in order to encourage the use and development of new and innovative technological
systems of air pollution control, Congress in 1977 enacted a new subsection 6 8 to provide a procedure whereby a company proposing to use
such technology could apply to the administrator for a waiver from the
requirements of section 111 provided certain conditions were met.
The issue in the Central Illinois Public Service case involved the
61. 594 F.2d 636 (7th Cir. 1979). The Environmental Protection Agency is hereinafter referred to as the EPA.
62. The Clean Air Act was previously codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-18571(1976), and section
I I was codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-6 (1976). The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L.
No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977), have been recodified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7626 (1978). The
amended version of section III is located at 42 U.S.C.A. § 7411 (1978 pamph.).
63. Id. § 741 1(b)(l)(A).
64. Id § 7411(b)(1)(B).
65. Id § 7411(a)(1).
66. Id § 7411 (a)(2).
67. Id § 7411 (e). The section provides that:
[lit shall be unlawful for any owner or operator of any new source to operate such source
in violation of any standard of performance applicable to such source.
68. Id § 7411(j). The section provides, in pertinent part:
Any person proposing to ow n or operate a new source may request the Administrator for
one or more waivers from the requirements of this section for such source or any portion
thereof with respect to any air pollutant to encourage the use of an innovative technological system or systems of continuous emission reduction.
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proper time for the filing of the request for the waiver as provided for
under the amendment. The company applied for its waiver after it had
placed in operation a new coal-fired generator with an innovative
double alkali flue gas desulfurization system for the control of sulfur
dioxide emissions. The administrator denied the request on the ground
that a company could not apply for a waiver after it had placed a new
69
source in operation.
The Seventh Circuit in CentralIllinois Public Service unanimously
reversed the administrator's denial of the request. The court rejected
the administrator's conclusion that, based on the prospective language
in section 111,70 a company already operating a new source could not
obtain a waiver. In so doing, the court concluded:
Apparently [the Administrator] interpreted the language to require
application during the proposal stage of the project, which would
clearly bar an application made after the project had already commenced operations. We do not believe that the language can be
given this interpretation, however, because a project becomes more
than a proposal once construction commences, yet the EPA agrees
that application for a waiver may be made during construction. If
application is not restricted to the proposal stage, the rationale for
the Administrator's denial of a post-startup application falls. 7 1
The Seventh Circuit in Central Illinois Public Service conceded that
startup in violation of the applicable standard of performance would be
significant 72 in view of the prohibition of section 11 (e), 73 but merely
noted that the administrator's decision did not rely on that section nor
on the fact that the generator was in violation of the standard of performance for new coal-fired steam generators 74 at the time of application. The court, as a consequence, did not express any view as to
whether section 11 (e) would bar a waiver application by a company
already in violation of the relevant performance standard. 75
In Central Illinois Public Service, the Seventh Circuit appears to
have divided the life-cycle of a new source into four possible stages:
proposal, construction, startup and operation, and operation in violation of the standard of performance. 76 The court held that application
for a waiver may be made during any of the first three stages and took
69.
70.
ate," "is
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

594 F.2d 636, 637 (7th Cir. 1979).
Id at 637. The language employed included phrases such as "proposing to own or operto be located," "proposed system," and "proposed source."
Id (citations omitted).
Id
42 U.S.C. § 7411(e) (Supp. 1 1977). See note 67 supra.
594 F.2d at 637. See 40 C.F.R. § 60.43 (1978).
594 F.2d at 637.
Id.
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no position on whether a waiver could be sought during the fourth
stage. 77 This approach by the Seventh Circuit ignores the plain language of the Clean Air Act. The correct approach would delineate two
stages: pre-operation, during which application for waiver may be
made, and post-operation, where waiver is barred. It must be
remembered that the purpose of the waiver provision is to permit a new
source to operate even though it is not in compliance with the requirements of an applicable standard of performance. If the source were in
compliance with the standard, it would not need a waiver. Absent the
waiver, section 111 would otherwise prohibit any violative operation of
78
the source. Another provision, section 111(j) of the Clean Water Act,
cannot and should not be read as permitting the continued operation of
a new source that is out of compliance with a standard of performance
until such time as the owner or operator, at its leisure, gets around to
79
applying for a waiver.
Taken as a whole, section 111 provides the owner of a new source
with three options: operate in compliance with the appropriate standard of performance, operate with a waiver from compliance with the
standard, or do not operate at all. The language of section 111(e) is
clear and unambiguous and the Seventh Circuit's dismissal of its provisions is unpersuasive. Whether or not the administrator cited section
111 (e) as a reason for denying the waiver is irrelevant; the section is in
the law, and the Seventh Circuit should not have brushed it aside. The
77. Id
78. 42 U.S.C. § 741 1(j)(1)(A) (Supp. 1 1977).
79. Section I 11(j) of the Clean Water Act provides, in pertinent part:
Innovative Technological systems of continuous emission reduction
(1)(A) Any person proposing to own or operate a new source may request the
Administrator for one or more waivers from the requirements of this section for such
source or any portion thereof with respect to any air pollutant to encourage the use of an
innovative technological system or systems of continuous emission reduction. The Administrator may, with the consent of the Governor of the State in which the source is to
be located, grant a waiver under this paragraph, if the Administrator determines after
notice and opportunity for public hearing, that(i) the proposed system or systems have not been adequately demonstrated,
(ii) theproposed system or systems will operate effectively and there is a substantial likelihoodthat such system or systems will achieve greater continuous emission reduction than that required to be achieved under the standards of performance which
would otherwise apply, or achieve at least an equivalent reduction at lower cost in terms
of energy, economic, or nonair quality environmental impact,
(iii) the owner or operator of the proposed source has demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Administrator that the proposed system will not cause or contribute to an
unreasonable risk to public health, welfare, or safety in its operation, function, or malfunction, and
(iv) the granting of such waiver is consistent with the requirements of subparagraph (C). . ..

(C) The number of waivers granted under this paragraph with respect to a proposed technological system of continuous emission reduction shall not exceed such
number as the Administrator finds necessary to ascertain whether or not such system will
achieve the conditions specified. . ..
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court's decision in CentralIllinois Public Service was simply not in accord with the Clean Water Act.
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF WATER
POLLUTION CONTROL LAWS

The EPA administrator was again unsuccessful in Citizensfor a
Better Environment v. EPA. 80 Citizens for a Better Environment involved a challenge to the administrator's approval of the State of Illinois' program to administer the National Pollutant Discharge
8
Elimination System within the state. '
Section 301 of the Clean Water Act 82 generally prohibits all discharges into the navigable waters of the United States unless they are in
compliance with the terms and conditions of an NPDES permit issued
in accordance with section 402 of the act. 83 Initially, administration of
the permit program was vested in the EPA, but Congress contemplated
84
that much of this authority would ultimately devolve upon the states.
In 1977, the State of Illinois applied for authority to administer the
permit program. The EPA approved, finding Illinois' plan to be in full
compliance with section 402 and the guidelines for state NPDES programs. 85 The Citizens for a Better Environment,8 6 a non-profit public
interest organization, challenged this approval, contending that the Illinois scheme was deficient in that it failed to provide for adequate citizen participation in the enforcement of the program.
The question of what constitutes an "adequate" degree of public
participation in the enforcement of state NPDES program requirements is complex and not without ambiguities. The statute requires the
EPA administrator to promulgate guidelines establishing the minimum
procedural standards and other elements necessary for a state permit
program. 87 These elements must include requirements for monitoring,
reporting, funding, and manpower as well as enforcement provisions.
Once these guidelines were promulgated, any state could request EPA
approval of its program.88 The administrator must approve the state's
80. 596 F.2d 720 (7th Cir. 1979).
81. Id.
82. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1976). The 1977 amendments did not affect the substance of any of the
sections here at issue.
83. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1342 (1978).
84. Id §§ 101(b), 402(b), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251(b), 1342(b) (Supp. 1 1977).
85. 40 C.F.R. § 124 (1978).
86. Hereinafter referred to as CBE.
87. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(i) (Supp. 1 1977).
88. The statutory basis for approval is described in section 402(b) of the Clear Water Act. 33
U.S.C. § 1342(b) (1976).
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program if the administrator determines, inter alia, that the program is
adequate to abate violations of the permit or other elements of the program.8 9
These sections are the only provisions of the Clean Water Act that
speak directly to the question of the enforcement requirements of state
permit programs. The sections do not denominate public participation
as one of the necessary elements. Rather, several sections of the Clean
Water Act must be read with the enforcement requirement section to
establish the element of public participation. Section 101(e) 90 sets out
an unequivocal declaration of congressional policy:
Public participation in the development, revision, and enforcement
of any regulation, standard, effluent limitation, plan, or program established by the Administrator or any State under this [act] shall be
provided for, encouraged, and assisted by the Administrator and the
tates. The Administrator, in cooperation with the States, shall develop and publish regulations specifying minimum guidelines for
public participation in such processes. 9'
In addition, section 50592 establishes the right of a private citizen to
initiate a civil action to enforce a permit or permit condition, intervene
in any enforcement action pending in a federal court, file suit against
the administrator for failure to perform a non-discretionary act, and
recover reasonable attorney and expert witness fees developed in the
pursuit of such actions. Finally, section 101(b) establishes the congressional policy to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of the states to prevent, reduce, and eliminate
93
pollution.
The Illinois program at issue in Citizensfor a Better Environment
provided for a private person to file a complaint with the Pollution
Control Board against any person allegedly violating any permit term
or condition. The program did not, however, contain any of the other
participation opportunities afforded private citizens by section 505 of
the Clean Water Act. According to CBE, this made the program fatally
deficient. Although conceding that the Illinois program met all the requirements for state programs, 94 CBE argued that the requirements
89. Id Section 402(b) does not explicitly state that the program, to be approved, must meet
the "minimum procedural and other elements" set forth in the section 304(i) guidelines.
90. Clean Water Act of 1975 § 101(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(e) (1976).
91. These "public participation" guidelines are codified at 40 C.F.R. § 105 (1978). However,
the administrator did not bring the existence of these guidelines to the attention of the court until
he filed his petition for rehearing. See 596 F.2d at 725-26.
92. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1976). The "citizen rights" enumerated in section 505 were not carried
over as necessary program elements in either 40 C.F.R. § 105 or § 124 guidelines.
93. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1976).
94. See 40 C.F.R. § 124 (1978).

ENVIRONMENTAL

LAW

themselves were incomplete and the Illinois plan did not comport with
95
the overall public participation mandates under the Clean Water Act.
Thus, although framed in terms of a challenge to a specific EPA determination in applying the guidelines to a particular set of facts, CBE
was in reality challenging the statutory adequacy of those guidelines.
This is the somewhat confused background against which the Seventh Circuit rendered the decision in Citizensfor a Better Environment
v. EPA .96 The court in the case held that "because EPAfailedto estabish guidelines by which the adequacy of the Illinois provisions for public participation in the enforcement of the state program could be
assessed, the EPA approval of the program failed to comply with the
terms of [the Act] and must be overturned. ' 97 The Seventh Circuit in
Citizensfora Better Environment placed the blame on the EPA administrator. The court concluded that the administrator had failed to establish guidelines regarding public participation in state NPDES
enforcement and had thereby ignored the statutory directive of section
101(e). 9 8 In so doing, the Seventh Circuit stated that "[tihe Administrator'sfailureto provide these guidelines, in violation of the Act's framework, compels reversal of his approval of the Illinois program." 99
The "failure to provide guidelines" argument had gathered so
much momentum that when the EPA, in its petition for rehearing, belatedly pointed out that the administrator had in fact promulgated the
guidelines required by that section at part 105, the Seventh Circuit
brushed the guidelines aside almost summarily, noting that "the regulations promulgated under section 101(e) of the Act . . . do not alter
the conclusion reached" in the original ruling. That conclusion, however, was that no public participation guidelines had been promulgated
at all-an apparent inconsistency not explained by the Seventh Circuit.
In characterizing the EPA's conduct as a "failure to promulgate,"
the Seventh Circuit utilized a "terminological inexactitude" that needlessly detracts from what is otherwise a penetrating and perceptive
analysis of the act. It would have been clearer and more accurate if the
Seventh Circuit had stated that although the EPA did promulgate public participation guidelines, they were not adequate under the act. In
any event, by relying on the language of section 101(e) as well as por95. The CBE also contended that the action was also a review of the minimum program
elements in 40 C.F.R. § 124 as they affected the case. See Brief for Petitioner at vii, Citizens for a
Better Environment v. EPA, 594 F.2d 636 (7th Cir. 1979).
96. 594 F.2d 636 (7th Cir. 1978).
97. Id at 721 (emphasis added).
98. Id at 724 (citations omitted).
99. Id at 725 (emphasis added).
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tions of the legislative history, I°0 the court in Citizensfor a Better En vironment found that the concept of citizen involvement in the
enforcement process is paramount under the act, surpassing even the
congressional recognition of the rights and responsibilities of the states
contained in section 101(b).10 1
Although the EPA contended that the question of the extent of
citizen participation in state enforcement proceedings pending in state
courts was one that should be resolved by the states under section
101(b), the Seventh Circuit disagreed, finding no conflict between that
section and section 101(e). 10 2 The court ascertained that under section
101(e) "the Administrator of the EPA has a duty to establish state program guidelines and evaluate state programs to insure that there ispublic
'0 3
particpationin the enforcement of these programs."'
Less obvious, however, is the amount and kind of public participation required by section 101(e). CBE argued that the Clean Water Act
requires state programs to incorporate the section 505 "citizen suit"
provisions, but the Seventh Circuit declined to decide what provisions
must be made for citizen participation in the state NPDES enforcement
process. 1 4 However, based on the court's rejection of part 105 of the
guidelines, it seems clear that section 505 is the standard against which
state programs will be judged. 0 5 In rejecting the guidelines, the court
in Citizensfor a Better Environment found the guidelines "pay lip-service, at best"' 6 to the congressional directive for public participation
and "do nothing to mandate citizen participation in the state enforce100. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 92-911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 132 (Mar. II, 1972), reprintedin I A
1972 at 819
(1973); S.REP. No. 92-414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 12 (Oct. 28, 1971), reprintedin 2 A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972 at 1430 (1973); CONF.
REP. No. 92-1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 100 (Sept. 28, 1972), reprintedin I A LEGISLATIVE HisTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972 at 283 (1973). See also I
A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972 at
108 (1973).
101. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (Supp. 1 1977).
102. See 596 F.2d at 724 n.6.
103. Id at 724 (emphasis added).
104. Id at 725 n.8.
105. The relevant portions of the rejected guidelines provide as follows:
Enforcement. Each state agency shall develop internal procedures for receiving and ensuring proper consideration of information and evidence submitted by citizens. Public
effort in reporting violations of water pollution control laws shall be encouraged, and the
procedures for such reporting shall be set forth by the agency. Alleged violations shall
be promptly investigated by the agency.
Legal Proceedings. Each agency shallprovide full and open information on legal proceedings under the Act, to the extent not inconsistent with court requirements, and where
such disclosure would not prejudice the conduct of the litigation.
Id at 726 n.2.
106. Id at 726.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF
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ment process."'' 0 1 This last phrase epitomizes the Seventh Circuit's
view of what constitutes adequate citizen participation within the
meaning of section 101(e): at a minimum, a citizen has a right to intervene in state enforcement proceedings. 0 8
Having delivered these general observations on the public participation requirements under the Clean Water Act, the court then declined to apply them to the Illinois program. Rather, the Seventh
Circuit held that the administrator's failure to provide guidelines, in
violation of the Clean Water Act, was sufficient to compel reversal of
the Illinois program irrespective of the terms of the program, 0 9 noting
that "Congress did not intend reviewing courts to make ad hoc determinations about the adequacy" of specific state plans." i0 The court
concluded its opinion by directing the EPA to withdraw its approval of
the Illinois program and take appropriate action in accordance with the
opinion.'
Subsequently, the EPA administrator notified the Seventh Circuit
that he was initiating a rulemaking proceeding that would, inter alia,
require states wishing to receive or maintain NPDES permit authority
to allow citizen intervention in enforcement proceedings and to provide
additional public participation measures. The rulemaking would require approximately nine months. Thus, the EPA asked the Seventh
Circuit to enlarge the time for entry of its mandate until completion 3of
that process." 2 The court granted a stay until February 23, 1980.'
The great public participation battle ended with a victory for the
private citizen. Although the EPA has delegated NPDES authority to a
majority of the states," 4 Citizensfor a Better Environment represents
the first challenge on the issue of citizen participation." 1 5 It remains to
be seen whether the EPA's proposed rulemaking will pass judicial muster. But for now, the EPA appears firmly committed to an expanded
107. Id The Seventh Circuit further stated that the guidelines require no more than that a
state "answer its telephone and listen and look into" a citizen's complaint and that the guidelines
are no more than a "legalistic articulation of a common courtesy." Id
108. See id at 723.
109. Id at 725.
110. Id
111. Id
112. In fact, the court seemed by inference to invite such a motion in its denial of the petition
for rehearing. See id at 726 n.3.
113. For the notice of proposed rulemaking involving increased public participation in the
permit process, see 40 Fed. Reg. 49,275 (1979).
114. See, e.g., Save the Bay, Inc. v. EPA, 556 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir. 1977).
115. CBE filed a similar challenge to EPA's approval of the Wisconsin permit program, but
the Seventh Circuit dismissed that petition on procedural grounds without a published opinion.
See 577 F.2d 748 (7th Cir. 1978).
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role for the private citizen in the enforcement of state pollution control
permits.
Before leaving Citizens for a Better Environment, consideration
should be given to some disturbing procedural and jurisdictional consequences that flow from the Seventh Circuit's treatment of a challenge
to the adequacy of substantive agency rules of general applicability.
Section 509(b)(1) of the Clean Water Act confers jurisdiction upon the
appropriate court to review specific actions of the administrator," 16 including any determination as to a state's permit program." 17 The CBE
in Citizensfor a Better Environment argued that a United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decision, California v. EPA,"1 8 established direct appellate jurisdiction to review substantive rules of general applicability." 9 The EPA, on the other hand, argued that the
Seventh Circuit lacked jurisdiction in Citizensfor a Better Environment
to hear a general challenge to the adequacy of the NPDES guidelines. 120
116. Clean Water Act § 509(b)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1369 (b)(l) (1976).
117. Id § 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(l)(D) (1976) (emphasis added). However, EPA action
in promulgating and publishing guidelines under either section 101(e) or section 304(i)(2) is not
included under section 509(b)(1). Presumably, judicial review of those actions would be available
under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1976), but jurisdiction to hear such
cases would normally be invoked on "federal question" grounds. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976).
118. 511 F.2d 963 (9th Cir.), rev'don other grounds sub nom., EPA v. California State Water
Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200 (1976). This case involved a section 509(b)(l)(D) challenge
to EPA action in approving permit programs submitted by two states but exempting federally
owned and operated facilities from their purview. The Ninth Circuit held that "the Act provides
for state regulation of federal as well as state dischargers . . . .Hence we declare invalid those
portions of [the federal NPDES permit program requirements] that exclude federal facilities discharging pollutants into navigable waters from compliance with any state permit program operating under NPDES." 511 F.2d at 965 (emphasis added).
119. Although the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, the Court seemed to ratify and,
indeed, adopt the Ninth Circuit's approach to the jurisdictional issue of reviewing regulations of
general applicability. The Court stated:
From the outset of EPA's administration of the NPDES and in its first regulations establishing the Section 304(h)(2) guidelines for state NPDES permit programs, .. the EPA
has taken the position [that federal facilities] are not subject to state permit program
rocedures. The implications [of this position] were soon made explicit in 40 C.F.R.
§125.2(a)(2)(b) (1975). . . .This construction by the Agency.

. .is reasonable and...

we sustain the EPA "sunderstanding. ...
426 U.S. at 226-27 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
120. The EPA contended that its NPDES regulations were not reviewable in the abstract but
could be reviewed only in the context of specific permit actions and proceedings. See 44 Fed. Reg.
32,854, 32,855-56 (1979) (to be codified at 44 C.F.R. § 121 (1979)). The EPA believed that two
factors militated against review in the abstract: the absence of a factual context to focus review,
and the absence of a concrete record to aid a reviewing court. In so stating, the EPA relied on the
authority of Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158 (1967); Diamond Shamrock Co. v.
Costle, 580 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1978); American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 543 F.2d 521 (3d Cir.
1976). These cases seem to suggest that the courts will apply a balancing test, weighing the interests of the court and the agency in postponing review until the issue arises in a concrete form
against any hardship to a party seeking relief from the challenged regulation's immediate and
practical impact upon it.
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Unfortunately, the Seventh Circuit did not address these jurisdictional questions. 12' The court's reticence is disappointing. To allow a
party to expand a specific challenge of a particular course of conduct
under a regulation into a general attack upon the regulation itself,
without apparent statutory authority, is, at the very least, precedential,
and the question ought to have been discussed by the court. The assumption of jurisdiction by the Seventh Circuit under the circumstances of this case calls into question the concept of finality in
administrative rulemaking. The court appears to be condoning a new
concept in jurisprudence, one that permits a challenge to the adequacy
of rulemaking to occur at any time by any party. This is a departure
from the traditional approach of requiring a general attack upon the
adequacy of agency rules to be made within either a statutorily speci122
fied time or, if there be none, within a reasonable time.
ADJUDICATORY HEARINGS UNDER THE

NPDES

PERMIT PROGRAM

The Seventh Circuit also decided against the EPA administrator in
2 3 Alon involved the NPDES permit
program affecting the Alton Box Board Company paperboard mill in
Alton, Illinois.
One provision of the Clean Water Act' 2 4 requires dischargers to
meet effluent limitations that call for the application of the "best practicable control technology currently available" by July 1, 1977. In addition, a discharger must meet any additional state standards by the same
date.' 25 The BPT effluent limitations are to be based upon effluent
guidelines promulgated by the EPA.' 26 These effluent limitations and
other requirements 27 are applied to individual dischargers through the
28
NPDES permit program.'
In Alton, the paperboard mill had been receiving about half of its
raw material from wood chips pulped at the plant with the balance

Alion Box Board Co. v. EPA.

121.

See 596 F.2d at 724.

122. Id.
123. 592 F.2d 395 (7th Cir. 1979).
124. Clean Water Act § 301(b)(l)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 131 l(b)(l)(A) (1976). "Best practicable con-

trol technology currently available" is hereinafter referred to as BPT.
125. Clean Water Act § 301(b)(l)(C), 33 U.S.C. § 131 l(b)(l)(C) (1976).
126. Id § 304(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b) (1976). See EPA Guidelines for the Pulp, Paper &
Paperboard Industry, 40 C.F.R. § 430 (1974).

The United States Supreme Court has upheld the EPA's method of establishing effluent limitations by regulation "so long as some allowance is made for variations in individual plants, as the
EPA has done by including a variance clause" in its limitations. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v.
Train, 430 U.S. 112, 128 (1977).
127. Clean Water Act § 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1976).

128. Id § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1976).
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coming from wastepaper. By 1973, it had become clear that the mill
could not comply with federal and Illinois pollution control standards
if the pulping of wood chips continued. In that year, Alton embarked
upon a program that would convert the mill to the exclusive use of
wastepaper and ultimately result in full compliance with the BPT effluent limitations for plants using wastepaper exclusively. At the time the
EPA published the BPT guidelines, the Alton mill was still using a
combination of wood chips and wastepaper. The initial stages of the
company's process change were completed by June 1975; after that
12 9
date, Alton used only wastepaper.
Alton's initial NPDES permit was issued in November 1974 and
was modified in April 1976; the modified permit was to expire in June
1977. The company applied for a renewal of the permit, but the EPA
denied this request in October 1977.130 The basis for denial was twofold: Alton could meet neither the BPT limits nor the more stringent
Illinois standards by July 1, 1977 and the Illinois EPA had refused to
certify the renewal permit.' 3' Alton requested an adjudicatory hearing
on the denial of the permit,' 32 contending that since the plant had undergone a process change after the promulgation of BPT limits, "fundamentally different factors" were present warranting a variance from
those limitations.133 The EPA refused to hold the adjudicatory hearing
34
on the ground that Alton had raised no issue of material fact. 1
The company appealed both the denial of the permit and the denial of the adjudicatory hearing. A unanimous Seventh Circuit in Aton ordered the EPA to hold the hearing but declined, under the
35
doctrine of primary jurisdiction, to order the issuance of the permit.
In so doing, the court held that Alton's contention that the necessity of
the process change was a fundamentally different factor, entitling Alton
to a variance, was sufficient to justify a hearing.136 The Seventh Circuit
rejected the EPA's argument that Alton had waived its right to raise the
129. 592 F.2d at 397.
130. Id at 396.
131. State certification is required by section 401(a)(1) before the EPA may issue a section 402
permit. See 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) (1976).
132. An adjudicatory hearing may be requested by any interested person whenever a permit is
granted, denied or modified. See 40 C.F.R. § 125.36 (1978). The Seventh Circuit held in United
States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1977), that the provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act apply to the granting or denial of NPDES permits by the EPA and that the act also
requires the holding of an adjudicatory hearing in such instances.
133. The "variance clause" allowing a showing of fundamentally different factors from the
relevant BPT limitations is set forth at 40 C.F.R. § 430.52 (1978).
134. 592 F.2d at 398.
135. Id at 399.
136. Id at 401.
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variance issue by not bringing it up at the time it applied for renewal of
the permit. The court in Alton found that the regulation itself sets no
which showed
such time limit and there was no evidence in the 1record
37
an "intentional and voluntary" waiver by Alton.
Alton established no precedent in the area of environmental law.
Rather, the Seventh Circuit corrected an error made by the EPA administrator in refusing to conduct the adjudicatory hearing. The administrator's refusal to conduct the hearing was improper since an issue
of fact-whether Alton was entitled to a variance-was so clearly present. Thus, the Seventh Circuit's decision in Alton to grant the adjudicatory hearing was a correct one.
COMMON LAW NUISANCE IN THE AGE OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT

The Seventh Circuit was confronted with the viability of a common law nuisance action under the Clean Water Act in Illinois v. City of
Milwaukee. 38 In what appears to be a case of first impression, the
court provided a penetrating analysis of the ancient and honorable
common law right of the sovereign to abate a public nuisance and
found that the right has survived the enactment of federal water pollu39
tion control legislation.
The facts in City of Milwaukee are fairly simple, but the legal
ramifications flowing from them are much more complex. The city of
Milwaukee owns and operates two sewage treatment plants which
process wastes collected from within its corporate limits and from several surrounding communities. The treated effluent is generally, but
not always, in compliance with the secondary treatment standards required by section 301(b)(l)(B) of the Clean Water Act. 140 On some
occasions, particularly during periods of heavy rain, Milwaukee's combined storm and sanitary sewers overflow, causing the discharge of raw,
untreated sewage. Whether treated or untreated, the effluent enters the
waters of Lake Michigan where it is carried by current southward into
Illinois waters close enough to the shoreline to come into contact with
137. Id at 400.
138. 599 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1979).
139. Id. at 153.
140. 33 U.S.C. § 131 l(b)(i)(B) (1976). The 1977 amendments did not change this requirement. "Secondary treatment" is defined in terms of quality of the effluent for specified pollutants.
For biochemical oxygen demand (five day), the arithmetic mean of the values for effluent samples
collected in a period of thirty consecutive days shall not exceed thirty milligrams per liter; this is
commonly expressed as thirty mg/I BOD. For suspended solids, the arithmetic mean for samples
collected in a thirty day period shall not exceed thirty milligrams per liter (30 mg/l SS). See 40
C.F.R. § 133.102 (1978).
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bathers and to be inducted into drinking water treatment plants. Bacteria in the effluent can obviously cause infections in human beings with
whom it comes in contact. The State of Illinois brought suit to require
Milwaukee to eliminate the combined sewer overflows entirely and to
upgrade the level of its sewage treatment to better than secondary. 141
The district court agreed and ordered Milwaukee to undertake an extensive construction program to provide increased storage and holding
capacity by 1989 so that there would be no overflows of untreated sewage.' 42 The district court further ordered Milwaukee to provide treatment facilities which by 1986 would result in an effluent standard
higher than required by EPA regulations and the NPDES permits in
43
effect for the two plants. 1

The city of Milwaukee appealed to the Seventh Circuit. The court
in City of Milwaukee was presented with two issues: whether a court in
a common law nuisance action can order a greater degree of relief than
is available under a comprehensive federal statute and whether the evidence before the district court was sufficient to support the relief it
granted. The Seventh Circuit unanimously held that the Clean Water
Act does not limit the relief which may be ordered in a nuisance case,
but that the evidence before the court was sufficient to support only
141. The history of this case is long and complicated. Illinois originally moved for leave to file
a complaint in the Supreme Court under original jurisdiction doctrine U.S. CONST. art. I1, § 2, cl.
2; 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (1976). The motion was denied on the ground that a municipality is not a
"state" within the meaning of original jurisdiction doctrine. Instead, Illinois was advised to file its
complaint in a district court under the federal common law of nuisance. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 98, 107 (1972). Illinois then filed suit in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois. Defendants' motions to dismiss for lack of inpersonamjurisdiction and improper venue were denied. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 4 ERC 1849 (N.D. Ill. 1972),
as were defendants' subsequent motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 366 F. Supp. 298 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
142. 366 F. Supp. at 300.
143. The court held the city to a "5/5" standard rather than the "30/30" standard required by
EPA regulations and NPDES permits in effect at the two plants.
The NPDES permits for the two treatment plants were issued by the Wisconsin Department
of Natural Resources under section 402(b) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1341(b) (1976).
Although Wisconsin had the authority to enact limitations more stringent than those established
by EPA, the state did not do so here. The EPA did not exercise its authority to veto the permits
under section 402(d)(2). The Seventh Circuit succinctly summarized the differences between the
district court's requirements and those of the discharge permits:
All of the effluent limitations imposed by the district court, except the phosphorus limitation, are significantly more stringent than those prescribed by EPA or in the discharge
permits; in lieu of 30 mg/IBOD 5 and suspended solids, the district court requires 5
mg/I; in lieu of 200 fecal coliform cells per 100 ml, the district court requires 40/100 ml;
in lieu of the monitoring requirement for chlorine, the district court requires a free chlorine residual 15 minutes after exposure. Further, as to BOD 5 and suspended solids, the
district court imposes an absolute maximum of 10 mg/I instead of the variable 85%
removal requirement in the EPA regulations and the discharge permits.
599 F.2d at 174.
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part of the remedy fashioned by the district court. 144 Specifically, the
court upheld the order to eliminate the overflows, but reversed the requirement to upgrade the treatment level to better than secondary
treatment on the ground that the evidence of record did not support
that result. 145
Regarding the relief issue, Milwaukee argued that while the
1972146 and 1977147 amendments to the Federal Pollution Control Act,
now the Clean Water Act,' 48 did not preempt the federal common law
of nuisance, the amendments severely circumscribed the limits of relief
that could be granted under the act. 149 The act itself speaks to this
issue. Section 101(b) of the act provides:
It is the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the
primary responsibilities and rights of the States to prevent, reduce,
and eliminate pollution, to plan the development and use (including
restoration, preservation, and enhancement) of land and water reAdministrator in the exercise of his
sources, and to consult with the
50
authority under this chapter.'

Congress then built upon this foundation by confirming the right of a
state to adopt and enforce effluent limitations and abatement requirements more stringent than those established by the EPA. 151 This recognition of the right of individual state enforcement was reemphasized by
section 301 of the act which permits some diversity by the states in
approaching the goal of abating pollution. 52 Any remaining doubts as
144. Id at 175-76.
145. Id at 177.
146. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1977)).
147. Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1977)).
148. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1977)).
149. The State of Wisconsin argued amicus curiae that the act is a comprehensive scheme that
preempts the common law. 599 F.2d at 151. The United States argued amicus curiae to the
contrary. Id.
150. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1976).
151. Congress declared in section 510 that:
[Nlothing in this chapter shall (1) preclude or deny the right of any State or political
subdivision thereof. . . to adopt or enforce (A) any standard or limitation respecting
discharges of pollutants, or (B) any requirement respecting control or abatement of pollution; except that if an effluent limitation, or other limitation . . . is in effect under this
chapter, such state or political subdivision . . . may not adopt or enforce any effluent
limitation, or other limitation. . . which is less stringent than the effluent limitation...
under this chapter; or (2) be construed as impairing or in any manner affecting any right
or jurisdiction of the States with respect to the waters (including boundary waters) of
such States.
Clean Water Act § 510, 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1976) (emphasis added).
152. Clean Water Act § 301, 33 U.S.C. § 131 l(b)(l)(C) (1976). Section 301 requires that there
shall be achieved:
[N]ot later than July 1, 1977, any more stringent limitation, including those necessary to
meet water quality standards, treatment standards, or schedules of compliance, established pursuant to any State law or regulation. . . or any otherfederal law or regulation,
or required to implement an applicable water quality standard established pursuant to
this Act.
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to the intentions of Congress were dispelled by section 505(e) of the act
which declared that:
[n]othing in this section shall restrict any right which any person (or
class of persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek
enforcement of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any
153
other relief..
Finally, in section 51 (a) of the act, Congress stated that the act:
shall not be construed as . . . limiting the authority or functions of
any officer or agency of the United States under any other law or
regulation not inconsistent with the provision of the Clean Water
Act. 154
The Seventh Circuit in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee 155 looked to
the legislative intent behind the enactment of these sections. In so doing, the court found that Congress did not intend to preclude a state
from enacting limitations more stringent than those established by the
Clean Water Act.' 56 With regard to a common law nuisance action, the
Seventh Circuit in City of Milwaukee determined that there was no
congressional intent for the Clean Water Act to preempt a federal common law action of nuisance.' 57 In addition, the court held that the
Clean Water Act did not preclude a federal court, as an officer or
agency of the United States, from imposing more stringent effluent requirements which may be necessary to prevent harm in a common law
58
nuisance action. 1
Having recognized the right of Illinois to maintain this action and
obtain relief other than that provided for under the Clean Water Act,
the Seventh Circuit next examined the elements of the claim and the
appropriate standards of proof. The Seventh Circuit concluded that
Illinois had the burden traditionally present in a nuisance case-a preponderance of the evidence. 59 Applying this standard to the record
before it, the court in City of Milwaukee determined that the evidence
33 U.S.C. § 1311 (b)(l)(C) (1976) (emphasis added).
153. Id § 1365(e).
154. Id § 1371(a).
155. 599 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1979).
156. Id. at 162.
.157. Id at 163.
158. Id.
159. Id at 167. The Seventh Circuit noted that in exercising its original jurisdiction in pollution cases, the Supreme Court has adopted the preponderance of the evidence standard when the
polluter is a private party, Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 238-39 (1907), but a
clear and convincing evidence standard when the polluter is a state, New York v. New Jersey, 256
U.S. 296, 309 (1921). However, based on language in Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401
U.S. 493, 501-02 (1971), to the effect that the clear and convincing standard was an accommodation to the Supreme Court's function as an appellate tribunal, the Seventh Circuit held that the
rationale for requiring the higher standard of proof is inapplicable when the action is tried in a
trial court. 599 F.2d at 167.
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supported the district court's order to require Milwaukee to eliminate
the overflows, but did not support the order requiring Milwaukee to
upgrade the level of its existing treatment system. 160 In essence, the
court could find nothing in the record to connect the specific numerical
limitations imposed by the trial court with concrete, measurable protection of Illinois residents.16' Significantly, the Seventh Circuit did not
hold that limitations more stringent than required by the Clean Water
Act could never be ordered in a nuisance action. The court simply
62
stated that, on this record, such a remedy could not be supported.1
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee 163 appears to be the first "post-1972
amendments" case to raise the common law nuisance issue. The Seventh Circuit squarely faced this issue and rendered an important, precedential decision. The court's decision in favor of the rights of the
citizen to be protected from environmental nuisance is entirely consistent with the spirit of the court's concerns for the rights of public partic164
ipation as expressed in Citizensfor a Better Environment v. EPA.
CONCLUSION

The Seventh Circuit's 1978-79 term was marked by several significant decisions in the area of environmental law. With the exception of
Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. EPA,165 all cases appear to have
been appropriately decided. Although these decisions are few in
number, the 1978-79 cases illustrate that the Seventh Circuit continues
to make important contributions to the area of environmental law.

160. Id.at 168.
161. The Seventh Circuit was particularly concerned that unsupported conclusions by experts
were being offered in an effort to justify effluent limitations substantially more stringent than (1)
those established in the EPA regulations, (2) those established in the Wisconsin permits for the
purpose of protecting residents in the immediate vicinity of the discharges, and (3) those established by Illinois itself for waters other than Lake Michigan. The Seventh Circuit found the record to be conspicuously silent as to the reasons these less stringent standards were found adequate
to protect persons in the immediate environs of the discharges by experts presumably as dedicated
to the protection of public health and the environment as those experts relied upon by the State of
Illinois. The Seventh Circuit concluded:
Our difficulty with the evidence . . . is that it consists merely of conclusions of the experts and does not explain why the particular standards are necessary to protect the
ealth of Illinois residents. We are asked to accept the conclusions on faith. It is difficult
for us to see how the opinion of an expert can be intelligently appraised unless it is
supported by reasons.
Id. at 175.
162. Id at 176.
163. 599 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1979).
164. 596 F.2d 720 (7th Cir. 1979). See text accompanying notes 80-122 supra.
165. 594 F.2d 636 (7th Cir. 1979).

